Review: Miracles by Craig S. Keener

Keener, Craig S. Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts. 2 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011.

Craig Keener is one of the most prolific New Testament scholars of our day, known for his thick, well-documented tomes and encyclopedic knowledge of ancient sources. Keener delivers once again in Miracles. The overarching goal this work is to put to rest the argument (à la David Hume) that the miracles recorded in the New Testament could not have happened because enlightened moderns now know that miracles do not happen. To this end, Keener advances two theses: (1) “eyewitnesses do offer miracle claims” and (2) “supernatural explanations, while not suitable in every case, should be welcome on the scholarly table along with other explanations often discussed” (1).

Keener accomplishes the task with characteristic thoroughness; the book weighs in at two volumes totaling nearly 1,200 pages and includes copious footnotes, five appendices, and a bibliography of almost two hundred pages. The body of the work consists of four parts: (1) The Ancient Evidence, (2) Are Miracles Possible? (3) Miracle Accounts beyond Antiquity, and (4) Proposed Explanations.

In Part 1, Keener situates early Christian miracle accounts on the map of ancient miracle claims as a whole. While he finds some broad similarities between Christian and non-Christian miracle accounts (certain formal characteristics, the report of supernatural activity, etc.), he notes several significant differences including genre (the Gospels and Acts are biography/history, not myths or novels) and dating (the Gospels and Acts were written much closer to the events they report than most ancient miracle accounts were). Such differences lead Keener to conclude that “we should generally expect less legendary accretion in these first-century Christian sources than in many of the documents to which scholars have often compared them” (82).

Part 2 addresses the philosophical questions related to miracles. The primary burden of this portion of the book is to destabilize the a priori skepticism of miracles stemming from David Hume that has become so prominent in the modern West. In my view, one of the highlights in this section is chapter 4 (“Antisupernaturalism as an Authenticity Criterion?”). Here Keener makes two valuable points. The first is that ancients were hardly gullible about miracles. Rather, many ancient writers exhibit a healthy skepticism toward miracles yet report some miracles nonetheless. Second, Keener emphasizes that “antisupernaturalism emerged from specific historical circumstances no less than ancient or modern, Western or non-Western supernaturalist approaches” and therefore should not be presupposed (97). In chapters 5 and 6 he goes on to respond in detail to David Hume and others who argue against the possibility of miracles on the basis of human experience (i.e., miracles can’t happen because we know miracles don’t happen). Keener’s basic reply to Hume is that his argument is circular: “[Hume] argues, based on ‘experience,’ that miracles do not happen, yet dismisses credible eyewitness testimony for miracles (i.e., others’ experience) on his assumption that miracles do not happen” (108, emphasis original). Another valuable point Keener makes is that Hume’s assertion that miracles do not occur, which might have seemed self-evident in Hume’s eighteenth-century, Western context, is much harder to make today, when miracle claims proliferate from both the West and the majority world.

In Part 3, Keener goes on to argue that modern eyewitnesses do, in fact, claim to have observed miracles. In essence, here Keener says to Hume, “So miracles don’t happen, you say? Let me give you four hundred pages of eyewitness testimony to show that they do.” Keener provides examples from Asia (chapter 8), Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean (chapter 9), earlier Christian history leading up to the early twentieth century (chapter 10), and the recent West (chapter 11). He also includes a chapter on more dramatic miracles (healing from blindness, raising of the dead, etc.).

Having demonstrated his first and primary thesis (that eyewitnesses report miracles), in part 4 Keener turns to his secondary thesis (that supernatural explanations such claims deserve a place in scholarly discourse). Here he argues for the relatively cautious conclusion that one must at least keep an open mind toward supernatural causation when considering miracle claims: “Observers not committed to a methodology that a priori privileges any remotely possible naturalistic explanation over any supernatural . . . will not foreclose the possibility of supernatural explanations” (663).

Miracles is a tour de force with which any subsequent treatment of miracle claims in the New Testament must reckon. In my view, Keener’s greatest contribution is his careful documentation of modern miracle accounts in Part 3, which constitutes a creative and compelling response to Hume and the a priori skepticism toward miracles in the New Testament studies that depends on Hume. This portion is well worth the price of the book. And by prefacing it with a robust discussion of the historical (Part 1) and philosophical (Part 2) issues surrounding miracle claims, Keener prevents the eyewitness accounts he reports from being easily dismissed. In short, with Miracles Keener has made it impossible for any serious scholar to deny the validity of New Testament miracle accounts a priori.

With respect to critique, there is one area where I found myself wanting less from Miracles and another where I found myself wanting more. In the first place, Keener’s arguments against Hume and company in Part 2 become redundant. Keener rightly notes that Hume’s argument is circular However, he returns to this point over and over (e.g., 108, 157, 162), leaving the impression that this section might have been shortened considerably. (After all, the real evidence against Hume is in Part 3.) Second, in Part 4 I was disappointed not to find a substantive discussion of how to make sense of miracle claims in religions other than Christianity or by non-religious people. In Keener’s defense, this is not necessary to his two overarching theses. Nonetheless, since Miracles will presumably be the standard treatment of this topic for years to come, and since Keener does address the issue of causation, the question of who/what might be causing miracles outside of Christianity is a matter that would seem to merit at least a few pages.

In conclusion, Miracles is a magisterial work that I would recommend to anyone—layperson, pastor, or scholar—interested in miracle claims in the New Testament. For those who find the page count daunting, I would suggest skimming Parts 1, 2, and 4 and digging into the modern miracle accounts in Part 3.

My thanks to the publisher for the review copy.

Review: Gospel Writing by Francis Watson

Watson, Francis. Gospel Writing: A Canonical Perspective. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013.

In this volume, Francis Watson presents a new paradigm for Gospel origins. The standard account of Gospel origins that Watson seeks to unseat goes something like this: Mark wrote first, Matthew and Luke followed him (drawing on Mark and Q), and John came last, completing the canonical collection by the end of the first century. Other Gospels were composed later and are historically inferior, and differences between the four Gospels are an obstacle to be overcome (whether by harmonizing or adjudicating between traditions) rather than a resource. In Watson’s view, the fundamental problem with this paradigm is that it “overlooks or undervalues the process of reception” (6). Instead, Watson advocates for a “canonical perspective” (6) that takes seriously the fourfold canonical form of the Gospel and the historical process that generated it.

The body of the book falls into three parts. In Part One (The Eclipse of the Fourfold Gospel), Watson provides a sweeping survey of how the prevailing account of Gospel origins emerged. The story begins with Augustine’s De Consensu Evangelistarum, wherein Watson finds that “difference [between the gospels] is seen as a threat to be negotiated and techniques of harmonization are developed in order to ensure that multiple perspectives will always be reduced to singularity” (28). In opting for unity over diversity, Augustine paves the way for later Gospel harmonies, which constitute a “dismemberment of the gospels” (45) and are themselves the forerunners of the quest of the historical Jesus (44). In the second chapter, Watson focuses on Reimarus and Lessing, who push back against the harmonizing tendency but still view differences between the Gospels negatively. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the Q hypothesis, which for Watson “represents a movement against the diachronic flow of the early Christian tradition in which the life of Jesus is interpreted, in quest of an uninterpreted Jesus” (102–3). In short, the standard account of Gospel origins is heir to a long tradition of trying to flatten the fourfold Gospel, whether through harmonizing the individual witnesses or prioritizing an uninterpreted Jesus over them.

Watson begins to construct his alternative paradigm in Part Two (Reframing Gospel Origins). Drawing on Mark Goodacre’s renewed defense of the Farrer hypothesis, he argues in chapter 3 that Matthew and Luke’s non-Marcan overlaps are better attributed to Luke’s use of Matthew than to a Q source. Chapter 4 examines Luke’s role in more detail. Here Watson contends that Luke is an interpreter of Mark and Matthew. By this he seems to mean on the one hand that Luke does far more than regurgitate his source material with minor modifications (200), but on the other that Luke does not act as an independent author but rearticulates the tradition he has received (208).

Chapters 5 and 6 focus on noncanonical material. In chapter 5, Watson reconsiders the significance of the Gospel of Thomas, arguing that “Thomas preserves certain formal characteristics of the primitive Christian Sayings Collection (SC), a genre that predated the synoptic gospels and that remained important throughout the second century” (221). At first blush, to eschew Q and advocate for an early sayings collection (which is what Q is generally thought to be) might seem like a distinction without a difference. However, Watson’s SC is different from Q in at least two ways. First, it is not a single work but a genre. Second, whereas Q is composed of the non-Marcan overlaps of Matthew and Luke, the SC is simply a broad group of sayings texts that all the Synoptics could have drawn on. Watson dedicates chapter 6 to the Egerton Gospel and its relation to John, contending that John is dependent on and interprets the Egerton Gospel at a number of points. At the same time, the Egerton Gospel provides a precedent for John’s unique Christology.

Watson begins the final chapter in this section by clarifying his concept of reception, expressed in the following sevenfold form: datum > recollection > tradition > inscription > interpretation > reinterpretation > normativization (347–55). Key here is the notion that “interpretation and reinterpretation are not to be confused with free invention. They are not fictions but renewed attempts to articulate the significance of an already inscribed tradition” (370). Watson then goes on to examine the phenomenon of interpretation in John, the Gospel of Thomas, and the Gospel of Peter in order to demonstrate that the canonical/noncanonical distinction lies not in the texts themselves but in later decisions about them (i.e., normativization). While Watson does acknowledge the need for normativization, he strangely contends in his conclusion that the fourfold Gospel “represents a decision about community order and organization rather than a historical, literary, or theological judgment about the nature of early gospel literature” (407). We will return to this anon.

Part 3 (The Canonical Construct) turns to matters of Gospel reception and canon formation. In chapters 8 and 9, Watson argues that the fourfold Gospel was not a given in the second century but emerged under the influence of Irenaeus for the sake of “achieving consensus between Rome and Ephesus, East and West” (472). Chapter 10 examines Origen as an example of canonical hermeneutics. Finally, chapter 11 surveys depictions of the fourfold Gospel in Christian art.

Watson concludes the book with “seven theses on Jesus and the canonical gospel” (604–19):

1. The early church’s reception of the figure of Jesus is a dynamic interpretative process attested above all in its diverse Gospel literature.
2. Jesus is known only through the mediation of his own reception. There is no access to the singular, uninterpreted reality of a “historical Jesus” behind the reception process.
3. The early reception of Jesus is marked by the interaction of the oral and the textual.
4. Differentiation between canonical and noncanonical gospels is not based on identifiable criteria inherent to the texts.
5. The definition of “canonical status” presupposes both an ongoing production of gospel literature and divergent communal usage.
6. Early gospel literature is retrospectively divided by the formalizing of canonical and noncanonical status. It is therefore necessary to differentiate pre- and postcanonical stages in the reception of this literature.
7. A “canonical perspective” models a convergence of historical, theological, and hermeneutical discourses, rejecting the assumption that these are necessarily opposed to one another.

Gospel Writing is undoubtedly one of the most important books published in Gospels studies in the last decade. Watson promises a new paradigm for Gospels studies and delivers it with impressive breadth and depth. Throughout, the author moves seamlessly from Augustinian hermeneutics to detailed comparisons of canonical and noncanonical Gospels to Christian visual art. Readers will have to decide for themselves whether to adopt Watson’s paradigm wholesale, but to my mind the major contributions of this volume are as follows:

• It takes seriously the fourfold canonical shape of the Gospel and to creates space for the differences between the Gospels to be seen as a resource rather than a problem.
• It provides a more positive place for noncanonical material in the Gospel composition and canonization process.
• It destabilizes the Q hypothesis and adds a significant vote in favor of the Farrer hypothesis.

At the same time,Gospel Writing is open to criticism at a number of points. First, although Watson asserts that one must embrace the diversity of the fourfold Gospel, he provides the reader with scant resources for doing so. His basic position seems to be that one should regard Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John as (re)interpretations unified by their single object, Jesus. But if Luke is reinterpreting Matthew and Mark with the intention of bringing the reader closer to Jesus, how am I then to read Mark and Matthew? Should I read Luke as (more) true and his predecessors as less? It seems to me that two adjustments are needed to make Watson’s argument work. First, there must be some consideration of genre. Without knowing what sort of literature the Gospels are, we cannot know what level of correspondence to expect between them and the historical person Jesus whom they depict. Watson unfortunately includes no substantive discussion of Gospel genre in this volume. Second, the fact that the Gospels are unified by having Jesus as their object seems to suggest that in their canonical form some level of harmonization is justified since their individual portraits need to be able to somehow cohere in one person (the level of detail would be determined by their genre). However, once these adjustments have been made, Watson’s position does not seem particularly unique, so one is left wondering why all the fuss about plurality.

A second area of critique has to do with Watson’s contention that the fourfold Gospel was merely a decision about ecclesial unity rather than a historical or theological judgment. In the first place, even if Watson is correct that ecclesial unity played a large role, this does mean that historical and theological factors did not. In order to make his case convincingly, Watson would need to somehow demonstrate not only that community order was a factor but also that history and theology were not. Furthermore, Watson repeatedly asserts that the difference between canonical and noncanonical Gospels cannot be discerned “based on identifiable criteria inherent to the texts” (609). This is an odd claim, for to my knowledge we have no noncanonical Gospel that looks as much like the four canonical Gospels as they look like each other, both in their general character and overarching portrait of Jesus.

Finally, the argument as a whole could be shortened and tightened at several points. The parade example of this is Watson’s discussion of the fourfold Gospel in Christian art (chapter 11), which does not seem to contribute to the argument in a substantive way.

However, these shortcomings should not deter readers from engaging with Watson’s work. Gospel Writingis a monumental achievement that will continue to influence the Gospel origins discussion for years to come and deserves a place on the shelf of any serious New Testament scholar.

My thanks to the publisher for the review copy.

Book Review: The Word Enfleshed, by Oliver Crisp

Oliver Crisp, The Word Enfleshed: Exploring the Person and Work of Christ (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016), xviii +190pp. $26.99.

After having written in a more episodic, piecemeal fashion with various Christological essays, Oliver Crisp’s latest work on Christology provides a contiguous story about Christ. The sequence of topics are logical and tight, beginning with the divinity of Christ (chps. 1 and 2), then turns toward the constraints upon and possibility of the humanity of Christ (chps. 3–5), then to how it might be that Christ became human without compromise to his divinity or oneness of Person (chp. 6), and finally to what the union of divinity and humanity does for us (chps. 7–9). This is, in effect, a modern rendition of Anselm’s classic project of Cur Deus Homo, bringing together the Person and the work of Christ that many theologians have torn asunder.

The virtues of the book are many. With the tragic divorce between the person and being of Christ, Crisp’s “joined-up” account is refreshing. He clearly demonstrates the ramifications of one aspect of Christ upon the other. Though this requires sustained attention, nonetheless this is the way theology ought to be conducted—drawing implications and constantly recalibrating in light of other theological loci.

One might complain that it is not as technical as his previous work. Be that as it may, it might actually be a virtue since the technicality of Crisp’s previous work might be an obstacle for many. Here, we have one continuous, systematic Christology from divinity to humanity to work, readily accessible by upper division undergrads, grads, and possibly informed non-academics.

One might also complain that much of the material can be found in other sources, which is fully admitted by Crisp himself in his acknowledgment of the editors and publishers for allowing him to re-use and expand that previous material. And to that degree, one might object against the need for this new volume. That would not be entirely unjustified. On the other hand, when one goes about her daily business, does she really want to carry around a backpack full of various tools? Or would she be more content with the streamlined multitool that is conveniently portable? Mutatis mutandis, Crisp’s work. I suppose we educators could assign the various segments from the other works. Or we can have all of those centralized and arranged into a convenient, portable package.

The drawbacks, as to be expected, are few. Although I had just praised this work for being less technical, that also harms the overall quality when it comes to segments that require a more comprehensive defense. I will highlight one prominent example.

Crisp defends a particular version of compositional Christology (sometimes referred to as Model A). This version sees the Logos (who is identical with his divine nature plus whatever it is that makes him a Divine Person distinct from the Father and the Spirit) as being a part of a greater complex object, Jesus Christ. The other components is the human nature, which is itself composed of the body and the soul. In this way, the Logos is a co-part, so to speak, with the human nature to make up Jesus Christ (pgs. 25, 45, 99, 111). Clearly this view has the benefit of preserving a classical theist portrayal of the Second Person—including simplicity, immutability, and incorporeality (pgs. 25, 31). The major disadvantage, as admitted by Crisp himself, is that the Logos is not strictly speaking identical with Jesus Christ.

Such a controversial view requires more explication, it seems, for I was not entirely clear how the Logos could be ascribed human properties. If the configuration of the Incarnational components was slightly different, I could understand how the Logos could be said to have human properties since some properties of the parts transfer to the whole. For example, the apple is green in virtue of its skin being green. So too, perhaps, the Logos is said to suffer in virtue of its human nature, its part, suffering. But if the Logos is a part alongside other parts, as Crisp argues, then it is hard to see how properties from parts transfer to other parts. Just because my liver is squishy, that does not (thankfully) make my bones squishy. Part of the confusion here is that Crisp takes it that divine simplicity applies to the divine Persons. I am not clear on why that must be the case. As I have understood it, and I admit my limited experience in this matter, simplicity is a characteristic of the divine nature or the divine substance, not of the Persons.

Still, this is an enjoyable and thought-provoking read. Although I still regard his Divinity and Humanity as his magnum opus, I still recommend this book. I could see myself using this book as one of the core texts for a Christology course since it neatly and tightly covers key aspects of the doctrine of Christ in a contiguous, comprehensive manner while highlighting Crisp’s usual sharp thinking and clear writing.

My thanks to Baker Academic for a review copy.

Review: Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology

Timothy Pawl, In Defense of Conciliar Christology: A Philosophical Essay, Oxford University Press, 2016, 251pp., $110.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780198765929.

I like action movies, despite overly familiar tropes like the hero having to disarm a bomb with only seconds to spare. Something similar is occurring with Timothy Pawl’s book, In Defense of Conciliar Christology. In a panic-inducing short amount of time (less than 300 pages, all told), the hero (Pawl) seeks to disarm a bomb (the allegation that Conciliar Christology—the doctrine of the Incarnation as portrayed by the seven Ecumenical Councils—results in contradiction).

Like the action hero, Pawl expertly analyzes the situation. He proposes that there are several different means to disarming the allegation of contradiction. But some methods, like the missteps in an action movie, does nothing at all (the explosion still goes off), or it may make things worse (the countdown accelerates), or it might make things a bit better, but still results in contradiction (the explosion is smaller, but nevertheless still occurs). Pawl is looking for the right wire to cut to render the entire explosive inert: There is no logical contradiction in Conciliar Christology.

If my analogy to an action film makes Pawl’s book sound like a quick page-turner, let me disillusion my reader right now. It is not. But that is not because Pawl’s book is boring. Rather, it is deeply technical, thought-provoking, and a treasure trove of references (I found myself stopping on almost every page to think very carefully of the inferences he was drawing and to look up—and often sneak away to check out from the library—the sources with which he interacts). Do not expect this to be a quick weekend read if you are anything like me.

I won’t burden the reader with reciting all of the chapters of Pawl’s book. The best way to understand the tight argumentative narrative in which Pawl is engaging is to negate one of the individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a contradiction. A logical contradiction is committed if one affirms of one and the same object an attribute and the attribute’s compliment at the same time and in the same sense. So claiming that Kevin Wong is both five-and-a-half feet tall and not-five-and-a-half feet tall at the same time in the same way is a contradiction. Pawl explores the various options:

• Maybe we’re not talking about one and the same object
• Maybe we’re not talking about an attribute and its compliment (i.e. its opposite)
• Maybe we’re not talking about the object’s two kinds of predications at the same time
• Maybe we’re not talking about the object’s predications in the same sense.

Pawl’s solution to the problem is unique in that he embraces the last option, but in an unexpected way: What would otherwise be contradictory predicates is not for an object of two natures. I won’t spell out for the reader just quite how he does so, since any summary of mine will not do his solution justice (though I highly recommend pgs. 155–59 for a summary in Pawl’s own words).

A colleague here at Wheaton, inquiring about the nature of Pawl’s book, asked if Pawl did anything new. Sic et non, as even he would admit (e.g. 206). This is nothing new in the sense that the Church has always struggled to make sense of the Incarnation, to evade formal contradiction with sophisticated and technical metaphysical theorization. But, it is something new in that it has been updated to meet today’s standard on formal logic and to engage the broad range of alternate solutions.

The virtues of this book are many. In the first instance, I wish to commend Pawl for making a serious attempt at delving into the complex conceptual history of theology. I will leave for historians of theology whether Pawl is successful at his attempt or not. I highlight his attempt as a virtue, however, since a perennial complaint against analytic theology is that it does not pay enough attention to tradition. Happily, I have yet another counterexample against that complaint.

Second, this is an exemplar of analytic theology at its best. Pawl is incredibly careful and nuanced, sure to leave no stone unturned for drawing inferences and laying out in painstaking steps why certain options are unavailable or unsavory for those holding to all seven Ecumenical Creeds.

Third, I am thoroughly impressed by the novel appropriation and modification of Aristotle’s square of oppositions in service of the Christological logic (p. 166). This was indeed quite clever and thought-provoking. I am not sure I am entirely persuaded by this move, but neither am I entirely un-persuaded either (perhaps, to borrow Pawl’s logical technique, the properties of being persuaded and being un-persuaded are subcontraries). This is indeed something worth revisiting and re-thinking.

Impressive as Pawl’s book has been, I have some hesitations for a wider, non-analytic audience. His intended audience is both theologians and philosophers (p. 2). But I wonder how well theologians, particularly of the non-analytic stripe, could follow. The tight logical inference is of great benefit for those who can track it. His explanation on pg. 84 seems to be something a non-specialist could follow quite easily. However, the same cannot be said for pgs. 79 or 82–84. I could follow those because I have had some training in formalized logic (admittedly, I am not as proficient as I ought to be). But how will theologians track the argument? Perhaps that is more of a commentary on contemporary theologians than it is on Pawl. Certainly, the quality of interdisciplinary dialogue and cross-training is often not what we want it to be given the academic push towards (hyper)specialization.

Further, despite Pawl’s overall careful style, there were moments of ambiguity that muddied his account. I had just praised him for the innovative use of the square of opposition. But I am not entirely convinced simply because I don’t think Pawl spent enough time making the distinction between passibility, impassibility, non-passibility, and non-impassibility such that the square of opposition works for the Incarnation. I want it to work. I think it would be a valuable contribution. But as it stands, I’m not sure I understand the distinction well enough to be convinced. That is, no doubt, in part due to my inadequacies. But if we use my skills and experience as a heuristic for other theologians, again I wonder how successful Pawl actually communicates to contemporary non-analytic theologians.

Another ambiguity is the lack of characterizing the “sustaining” relation between the Logos and his human nature. I think what Pawl was getting at, but I am not entirely certain, is something akin to the substance-accident relation. That is, while a substance is qualified by the accident (i.e. some characteristic is conferred to the entity; blueness makes my coffee mug blue), the accident is made to exist by the substance (i.e. the coffee mug will continue to exist even if its particular instance of blue is destroyed, but the converse is not true—should the coffee mug suddenly cease to exist, its particular instance of blue would go with it). Something akin is occurring with the Incarnation. The Logos is qualified by his human nature; he is made human in virtue of his human nature; his human nature confers humanity to the Logos. And there is reciprocity: The Logos confers existence to the human nature. While the Logos presumably confers existence to all creaturely things whatsoever, he is not qualified by any of them. Nothing about me returns to the Logos any sort of qualification. “Aptly said” (and its cognates) are pervasive throughout Pawl’s text, but little is said about what it actually means, and it would have served the reader had Pawl taken some time defining or characterizing what he means.

So, did Pawl disarm the bomb? I think he has. Besides those flaws, Pawl’s work is outstanding. He is to be applauded for a marvelous contribution and I hope he will continue to develop these ideas further. And while not all of us could be an action hero in a like way (some of us might be the plucky sidekick comic relief), we can nonetheless appreciate the Herculean accomplishment. This is a book well worth reading and re-reading for years to come.

My thanks to Oxford University Press for the review copy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Free Lecture on Feb 8: Eleonore Stump, Suffering, Evil, and the Desires of the Heart

From Biola University’s Center for Christian Thought:

Join us in Newport Beach, CA for a free lecture featuring philosopher Eleonore Stump, as she discusses the nature of suffering, the problem of evil, and the need for a theodicy (or justifying response). How can we develop a response to the problem of evil that is sensitive to the human experience of suffering and the desires and longings of the heart? Dr. Stump will draw on scripture, ancient Christian teaching, and philosophical reflection on the meaning of human flourishing within God’s will.

This event is free and open to the public. Jazz and refreshments reception to follow. For more information, including event location and registration, click here.

CFA: Fourth Theistic Ethics Workshop

Announcement from Christian Miller (Wake Forest University), Mark Murphy (Georgetown University), and Christopher Tucker (College of William and Mary):

The organizers of the fourth annual Theistic Ethics Workshop encourage abstract submissions for our meeting at Wake Forest University on October 4-6, 2018. Details can be found here:

http://college.wfu.edu/philosophy/miller/fourth-theistic-ethics-workshop/

CFP: EPS Far West 2018

Call for Papers from R. Scott Smith, EPS Secretary-Treasurer:

The far west regional meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society will take place Friday, April 13, 2018, at Grand Canyon University, Phoenix, AZ, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the far west region of the Evangelical Theological Society.

Call for Papers

The EPS is expecting papers for up to 6 parallel sessions. I would like to encourage having a good range of faculty and student presentations.

1. Paper proposals may be on any philosophical topic of interest to Christian philosophers, theologians, or biblical studies scholars. If you have a paper on a theme closely related to the ETS conference theme [see note below], that would be appreciated.
2. Please submit a short abstract (no more than 200 words) of your paper to myself, scott.smith@biola.edu, BY FEB 15, 2018. Please just write it in the body of an e-mail message.
3. Sessions are limited to 40 minutes, so please plan on taking up to 25 minutes to read your paper (i.e., about 12.5 pages, double-spaced, Times New Roman 12 pt). We want to have time for questions and answers.

I will contact you later with information about the papers that are accepted, as well as schedule, registration, and optional banquet info (which is a good time to mingle and build relationships).

You also may know of students who should be encouraged to submit a proposal – if so, please do that. All presenters will need to be(come) members of EPS.

NOTE: The ETS theme is Christology, and the plenary will be a discussion of how Christology is the intersection of all disciplines, by Dr. Stephen Wellum. Any paper on the theme of Christology that is presented can also (if the author chooses) be considered for publication in JBTS, which is a journal for which Dr. Daniel Diffey, the ETS regional VP & host, serves as general editor. (You can see the journal online at www.jbtsonline.org, and it is printed by Wipf & Stock.)

2018 Women in Apologetics Conference

I have not been keeping up with the apologetics scene for some years now, but I recently learned that my alma mater, Biola University, is hosting a conference on Women in Apologetics on Jan 19th to 20th. I am familiar with some of the speakers and am pleased to be introduced to some new (to me) names and faces.

Registration, both attendance and live streaming, can be found here.

Free Luncheon for Women Scholars

The Logia Initiative and the Los Angeles Theology Conference are hosting a free luncheon for women scholars at Fuller Theological Seminary on January 19th, 12:30 to 2:00. Registration is required.

Click here for more details.

Summer School/Conference: The Nature of God: Personal and a-personal concepts of the divine

For recent PhDs and current graduate students of theology and philosophy, the University of Regensburg and the Munich School of Philosophy, Innsbruck University are hosting a summer school and international conference investigating personal and a-personal concepts of God.

Applicants of any philosophical and theological persuasions with a strong interest in the analytic tradition are encouraged to apply.

In most cases, successful applicants will receive full expenses for travel, lodging, and board.

Details can be found here.